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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CLARENCE WOODARD and INA WOODARD, 
* Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
* 
vs 
JESSE R. ALLEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the District Court of 
the Fourth Judicial District in and 
for the County of Duchesne, Honorable 
R.L. Tuckett, Judge. 
J. Vernon EEickson and Tex R. 
Olsen, Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants. 
J. Grant Iverson, Attorney for 
Defendant and Respondent. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * C IARENCE WOODARD and INA WOODARD 1 
• 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
* vs 
* JESSE R • ALLEN I 
* Defendant and Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
CIVIL NO. 8031 
• BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
This action was brought by Clar-
ence Woodard and Ina Woodard, his wife 
against Jesse R. Allen, defendant, to 
enforce a certain contract for the 
sale by the plaintiffs and the pur-
chase by the defendant of certain real 
estate and personal property in Du-
chesne County, Utah. The defendant 
tiled an Amended Answer admitting he 
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signed the Uniform Real Estate Con-
' tract~ alleging there was a represen-
tation that the farm contained 170 
acres of cultivated land, while in 
truth and in fact said farm contained 
only 108 or 110 acres of cultivated 
land~ and further that the inventory 
of personal property attached to the 
Contract did not contain all of the 
personal property to be sold, and that 
an enlarged inventory was to have been 
madej and that the plaintiffs in vio-
lation of their agreement with the de-
fendant, sold certain items of person-
al property which were upon the premi-
a es , w h 1 c h'. plaintiffs had agreed 
should be delivered to the defendant 
as part of said contract of sale. And 
as an affirmative Defense to the ac-
tion, defendant alleged that on or a-
bout the 25th day of February 1952, 
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the plaintiffs and defendant~ mutually 
cancelled and rescinded saiq Unifot'm 
Real Estate ContractJ and as a Second 
Affirmative Defense, the defendant al-
leged that the plaintiffs were not the 
owners or a marketable title to the 
premises. 
This matter came on for trial be-
fore .the Court at Duchesne County, 
Utah on October 15, 1952 and the Court 
after taking the matter under advise-
ment, entered its decision that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to a de-
~ree of specific performance in this 
cause fo~ the reason that plaintiffs' 
title to the West half of the South-
west quarter of Section 13, and the 
East Half of the East half of Section 
14, Township 4 South, Range 2 West, 
Uintah Special Meridian is not market-
able} and said parcels contain 240 
acres of the 391 acres which the plain-
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tiffs contracted to eell to the defen-
dant. 
It is from this decision that the 
plaintiffs now appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It appears from the evidence ad-
duced at the trial that the plaintiffs 
Clarence Woodard and wife, on the 26th 
day of January 1952, listed with Fred 
Gagon, a real estate agent at Roose-
velt> Utah, their farm and home in Du-
chesne County, Utah, together with 
certain livestock and personal proper-
t~ as particularly described in the 
listing. On that day Mr. Gagon saw 
the defendant at the Roosevelt Hotel 
and told him he had this place for 
sale. (Tr. 8,9). The defendant Allen 
had 11ve4 in Pleasant Valley for 22 
years and his property adjoined that 
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of the plaintiffs, and he had to go on 
the Woodard property a quarter of a 
mile up the ditch once or twice each 
week to divert the irrigation water 
for his own place. (Tr. 32, 33, 48). 
Mr. Allen said he was interested in 
the Woodard farm. 
Negotiations were had forth and 
back, and on the 15th day of February, 
1952, Mr. Allen met with the real es-
tate broker at about 11 A.M. Mr. Ga-
gen had prepared a tentative contract 
or sale on a printed form known as a 
uniform real estate contract. The de-
fendant requested that his attorney be 
given the opportunity of going over 
the Contract, and so that afternoon 
Fred Gagen and his father, Ira Gagen, 
and the defendant met at the office of 
the defendant's attorney, James R . 
Ha 11 . ( Tr . 16, 80) . 
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The contract was not signed by 
the defendant Allen in Mr. Hall's of-
fice, but a meeting of the minds had 
taken place and later that evening the 
two Gagons met with defendant at his 
home with the completed contract which 
had been signed by the plaintiffs and 
which they presented to Mr. Allen for 
his perusal and signature. When the 
Gagons asked the defendant if he did-
n't want to go with them to see the 
place and check the inventory of per-
sonal property, he replied no, that 
they couldn't tell him anything about 
that ranch as he knew it better than 
they. ( Tr . 13 , 14 ) . The defendan t 
testified Mr. Gagon said the only 
thing that had been changed in the 
contract was that Woodard wanted to 
reserve the hand tools in his black-
smith shop, in connection with the hay 
bailer, and as the defendant Allen had 
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accepted the oil rights as stated in 
the contract, the contract was then 
signed by the defendant and the defen-
dant gave Mr. Gagon a cheek for$500.00 
to bind the deal. 
The defendant testified that next 
morning, February 16; 1952 he stopped 
payment on the $500.00 check he had 
given to the broker the evening before. 
When the defendant was asked by his 
own attorney on direct examination why 
he had stopped payment on this $500.00 
check, he replied to the effect that 
he was to have all of the oil rights 
en the first introduction) and then 
when the plaintiffs had pulled back to 
one-fourth, he figured the plaintiffs 
had a contract with Mr. Gagen and that 
they were taking those oil rights from 
hi, and he stopped payment until he 
could find out more about it, (Tr. 54), 
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although he previously testified that 
this matter of oil rights had been 
ironed out by their discussions in Mr. 
Hall's office, and that he had agreed 
to accept one-fourth of the oil rights. 
( Tr . 52 , 63 ) . 
On February 19, 1952 he met Mr. 
Woodard at his place. He didn't tell 
Woodard that he had gone back on the 
deal or intended to cancel the con-
tract. He testified that he said good 
morning to him and said he heard he 
had sold out and wanted to know what 
sort of contract Woodard had with the 
real estate men besides the one he, 
Allen, had signed. 1tJocdard said there 
was none. He testified that Woodard 
said everything b u t the two-wheel 
trailer and the cutter belonging to 
Sheriff Mitchell went with the place. 
He didn't then notice any personal 
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property having been removed from the 
place but the next morning he said 
there was some combination wire and a 
cement mixer moved. (Tr. 55, 56). 
The following Wecnesday evening 
the defendant testified Mr. Woodard 
and Mr. Gagon came to his home for the 
purpose of re-writing the contract. 
The defendant said he didn't see any 
sense to re-writing the contract then. 
They said that was what he wanted,~ 
wasn't it, but he replied that it was 
what he wanted the previous Saturday 
but not now for the reason that ther e 
had been property moved off the place. 
Then Mr. Woodard volunteered that Mr. 
Ross had his leveller down there and 
he had repaired it for him, and ano-
ther piece of machinery, a hay rake, 
had been moved by Mr. Rose, and the 
cement mixer which belonged to Fred 
Gagon was gone. None of these items 
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was listed in Mr. Allen's contract. 
Prior to that time no conversation had 
been had with Mr. Woodard aa to the 
number or cultivated acres in the farm, 
according to the defendant's own test-
imony. A discussion as to this came 
later when Woodard informed him that 
there was about 90 acres of alfalfa 
and about 18 acres of fall grain. Af-
ter that the defendant claims a dis-
cussion was had between Woodard and 
Gagon regarding the acreage listed by 
Woodard. (Tr. 56, 57). 
On eross examination Allen testi-
fied that he could read and write the 
English language and that he had an 
eighth grade education, but that he 
signed the Contract without reading it, 
although he had had benefit of legal 
advice concerning the deal and had op-
portunity to read the contract he was 
entering into before signing his name 
10 
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to it. He testified that he did not 
have knowledge as to whether any of 
the personal property as listed in the 
contract had actually been removed 
from the farm. (Tr. 61, 62). 
The defendant further testified 
that on February 27th, the plaintiff 
Clarence Woodard came to his home to 
ask the defendant what he intended do-
ing about the sale. The defendant re-
plied that since things hadn't gone 
according to their discussions he, the 
defendant, was willing to cancel the 
deal and call it off. Defendant test-
ified that Woodard said all right we 
will do it, and as he left defendant 
asked him to bring his contract to Mr. 
Hall's office and he would bring his 
and they would cancel them. About 
thirty minutes later they met in Mr. 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hall's office and Woodard said Gagon 
would not surrender his contract, but 
Woodard said (according to defendant's 
testimony) that they would call it off 
and asked Mr. Hall to help find him 
another buyer. (Tr. 58, 59). At no 
time was Ina Woodard, the plaintiff's 
wife, present or a party to any of 
these discussions. 
Clarence Woodard, the plaintiff; 
testified that he had known the defen. 
dant Allen for ten years, that the de-
fendant had lived near his ranch for 
many years and had been on his farm 
many times and that after he had lis-
ted his property for sale with Fred 
Gagon, a real estate broker, and after 
·~·negotiations had been had through Mr. 
Gagon and Mr. Allen, and the plaintiff 
and his wife had signed a contract of 
sale to them, the defendant Allen cal-
led at plaintiff's farm and informed 
12 
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Mr. Woodard that he had bought the 
place. Woodard at that time showed 
Allen how to start the tractor. The 
plaintiff further testified that Allen 
informed him he would like to take o-
ver the placeepretty~quiqk as it look~ 
ed like the sheep were going to start 
lambing. There was no discussion of 
the personal property that went with 
the place. {Tr. 33, 34, 35). Plaint-
iff emphatically denied that he had 
told Allen everything went with the 
place but two pieces of machinery. 
Plaintiff testified that he later 
had a discussion in Mr. Hall's office 
and that Mr. Gagen who was present 
there told the defendant Allen that 
all he bought was on the contract. The 
plaintiff said there was a discussion 
in Mr. Hall's office then about 170 
acres under cultivation and the plain-
tiff told defendant that there was 170 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
acres that could be farmed under the 
canal and more than he had water for, 
(Tr. 37, 38, 39). The plaintiff de-
mied that he ever agreed to cancel the 
contract after it was signed by the 
defendant. (Tr. 44). The plaintiff 
testified that he and his wife had al-
ways been ready and willing to perform 
the obligations required of them under 
the said contract. ( Tr. 36). 
The Plaintiffs introduced in evi-
dence an abstract of title on the pro-
perty covered in this action, and in 
addition several court files involving 
quiet title actions which had been 
brought on the property in question 
(Tr. 30), being Civil files No. 1974, 
1975, 1976 and 2017. 
The court in its decision herein 
disregarded the defendant's contention 
of misrepresentation as to acreage of 
cultivated property, disregarded def-
14 
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endant•s contention as to misrepresen-
tation or personal property and remov-
al by plaintiffs of certain personal 
p r ope rty, disregarded defendant's 
First Affirmative Defense, that the 
contract was mutually cancelled and 
rescinded on February 25, 1952; and 
made no findings on any or these three 
issues, but in his Memorandum Decision 
(Tr. p. 98) finds only on one issue; 
that the actions to quiet title being 
Civil files as numbered above, were 
ineffective to quiet title in the 
County in view of the case of Bowen 
vs. Olson, 246 Pac. 2nd, 602j and in 
view of the fact that title to a large 
portion of the ranch is not marketable, 
finds that plaintiff is not entitled 
to a decree of specific performance. 
15 
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STATE~NT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THAT THE EVIDENCE AND TEST!NONY 
OFFERED AND RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS AND IS EN'fiRE!.JY INSUFFICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION ~DE AND THE 
DECREE RENDERED. 
POINT 2 
THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW .AND TO RULES 
OF EQUITY. 
POINT 3 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
ERROR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 
OFFERED AND RECEIVED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS AND IS ENTIRELY INS~,FICIENT 
TO JUSTIFY THE DECISION MADE AND THE 
16 
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DECREE RENDERED. 
The defendant raised several de-
fenses to the action brought by plain-
tiffs for specif1·c performance of' the 
uniform real estate contract entered 
into by plaintiffs and defendants. The 
Court made no findings on these sever-
al defenses but found on one issue on-
ly, namely, that the plaintiffs' title 
to the West half of the Scuthwest 
quarter of Section 13 and the East 
half of the East half of Section 14, 
Township 4 South, Range 2 l'les t, Uintah 
Special Meridian is not marketable, 
said parcels containing 240 acres of 
the 391 acres which the plaintiffs 
contracted to sell to the d&fendant. 
The plaintiffs are not, therefore 
discussing herein the defenses raised 
by the detehdant of misrepresentation, 
removal of certain personal property 
agreed to be sold under said contract, 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and the defense of oral recision, it 
being presumed that the Court found in 
favor or the Plaintiffs on these 1s-
sues. 
The record does show that defend-
ant did not raise any objection to the 
Plaintiffs' title to the property un-
til an amended answer was filed Sept-
ember 9, 1952. The matter was then 
tried and the Court made a finding 
that the title to a certain portion ot 
said property was not marketable . 
There was no finding n-;D.de showing 
wherein the chain ot title·was defec-
tive, but only a finding that certain 
Quiet Title actions were defective. 
The question before this Court is 
then~ was the evidence and testimony 
offered and received by the trial 
court, sufficient to justify the deci-
sion made by the trial court that 
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cribed property was not marketable? 
Plaintiffs and Appellants contend 
that there was no evidence to justify 
such a finding. 
The record will show that the 
plaintiffs introduced in evidence a 
certain abstract of title on the prop-
erty covered by this action, which was 
introduced as Plaintiffs ' Exhibit "D". 
The abstract covered eighty-one pages 
and was last certified to on September 
4, 1952 by H.B. Mott Licensed Abs-
tractor. (Tr. p. 30). This abstract 
showed a fee simple title in the plain-
tiff, Clarence Woodard, with no de-
recta or omissions in the chain of ti-
tle. 
In addition there was also intro-
duced in evidence at this time Ci' .. ~ 1 
files No. 1974, 1975, 1976 and 2017, 
being certain actions to 
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County. and covering all of the prop-
erty involved in this action, the 
plaintiff Woodard having received his 
title through Duchesne County either 
directly or through a grantee or the 
County. 
These exhibits were introduced 
without objection by the defendant or 
his counsel. We quote from the Trans-
cript pages 30 and 31: 
"THE COURT: Just a minute . Mr. 
Iverson, do you wish to examine 
these exhibits? 
MR. IVERSON: I will at the end, 
Your Honor I won't take the time 
now, unless you want to take time 
out to do it. Let me say, I 
found from the abstract there had 
been some suits to quiet title 
b u t I haven't searched these 
tiles. 
"THE C CURT : You may have , if you 
wish, a stipulation they may be 
admitted in evidence and then, if 
it appears they are immaterial or 
if there is anything wrong, you 
may move to strike them. 
"MR. IVERSON: Let's do 1 t that 
way to save time, if it appears 
20 
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that the affidavits for publica-
tion or something" like that are 
defective. I will do that, other-
wise I will admit them. 
There is nothing further in the 
record that will disclose the defen-
dant or his counsel ever examined the 
abstract of title or the quiet title 
proceedings or that he ever made any 
objection thereto , or advised the 
plaintiffs and their counsel of such 
examination or objection. 
The record will disclose that the 
trial of the entire case was devoted 
to evidence and testimony concerning 
the three other defenses raised by the 
defendant, but is entirely silent as 
to the issue of the plaintiffs' title 
to the real property and its marketa-
bility, and any objections found or 
made by the defendant to such title. 
It is again brought to the atten-
tion of the Court. that the trial Court 
21 
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made no specific finding as to any 
specific defect in plaintiffs' chain 
or title. The finding made was con-
fined to a defect in the quiet title 
proceedings. 
Therefore Appellants must contend 
that the evidence was entirely insuf-
ficient to justify the finding ~f the 
trial court that plaintiffs' title to 
a portion of the real property was not 
marketable • 
POINT 2. 
THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL 
COURT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND RULES OF 
EQUITY. 
It is the contention of your Ap-
pellants that the quiet title actions 
referred to in the decision of the lo-
wer court were valid, and in fact ac-
complished the purpose they intended 
to accomplish. However 1t a question 
22 
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as to any defect in plaintiffs' title 
had been raised or called to the at-
tention of plaintiffs, general equit-
able principles would have required 
the defendant to allow plaintiffs to 
clear the title if defects were of 
such a nature they could be cleared. 
A recent case decided by the Sup-
reme Court of Arizona seems to well 
illustrate this general rule. The 
case of Sabin vs. Rauch; et ux, 255 
Pac. (2nd) p. 206, appears to be dir-
ectly in point with this matter now 
before the Court. An action for spe-
cific performance was brought by the 
plaintiffs and the defendant raised 
the defense of lack of marketable ti-
tle. The Supreme Court in remanding 
the matter for further hearing used 
the following language: 
"It would be inequitable to deny 
the plaintiffs relief without giv-
ing them an opportunity to remove 
23 
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the doubts concerning marketabil-
ity of title WhiCh:·,we 'hOlCl· to ex-
1st. If the impediment can be 
removed or removal thereof assur-
ed the defendant, the plaintiffs 
would be entitled to the decree 
which the trial court has render-
ed; otherwise defendant may not 
be required to perform." 
And quoting from 49 Am. Jr. 111, 
Specific PePformance, section 95: 
"The genera 1 rule is that, in the 
absence of express provision in 
the contract to the contraFJ ·' it 
is implied that the seller, when 
the purchaser meets his obliga-
tions under the contract, will 
convey a marketable title; and if 
it appears that he will be unable 
to meet this obligation) specific 
performance will be denied." 
Counsel for the Appellants are of 
the opinion that a good marketable ti-
tle is held by them. The abstract of 
title discloses they have held title 
and possession for over seven years, 
peaceably a n d quietly and without 
threat of litigation. But if any doubt 
existed plaintiffs have beerj :1nd now 
are ready and willing to furnish title 
24 
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insurance on eaid lands.· This option 
was extended to them in a provision or 
the contract between plaintiffs and 
defendant which provision reads as 
tollows: 
"The Seller on receiving the pay-
ments herein reserved to be paid 
at the timee and in the manner 
above mentioned agrees to execute 
and deliver to the Buyer or ass-
igns~ a good and sufficient war-
ranty deed conveying the title to 
the above described premises free 
and clear of all encumbrances ex-
cept as herein mentioned and ex -
cept as may have accrued by or 
through the acts or neglect of 
the Buyer, and to furnish at his 
expense, an abstract or policy of 
title insurance, at the option or 
the Seller, brought to date at 
time of sale or at time of deliv-
ery or deed at the option of the 
Buyer." 
Denial of tbis right afforded by 
the contract entered into by the par-
ties to this action would be grossly 
inequitable, and deny plaintiffs their 
contractual rights. No delivery of 
title insurance has been attempted to 
25 
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this date, as tender would have been a 
useless gesture in the race or the de-
fendant's steadfast and continuous re-
fusal to perform. In 62 Cor pus Juris 
658, the following language is used 
which seems to explain the general 
holdings or the court on the matter of 
tender in similar cases: 
"Tender is waived where the tend-
eree makes any declaration which 
amounts to a repudiation of the 
contract, or takes a position 
which would render a tender . 
a vain and idle ceremony. " 
This language is quoted with ap-
proval in the case of Oklahoma Farm 
Mortgage Co. vs. Cesor, Oklahoma, 62 
Pac . (2nd) 1269, and in the case of 
Spaulding vs. Porter, which is Colora-
do, 31 Pac. (2nd) 711. 
The provisions of the Contract 
show that the total purchase price was 
$51,500.00 which the defendant had the 
opportunity or payin~ $500.00 at the 
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date of signingJ $27,000.00 'on or be-
fore March 15, 1952, and the balance 
of $24,000.00 in yearly installments 
or $4000.00 or more per year. Thus he 
had a period of six years in which to 
finish paying the contract. Surely } 
if he had found any defects in the ti-
tle to these premises, he was amply 
protected by the unpaid balance, and 
could have held up payment therefore 
until the plaintiffs had been given op-
portunity to clear such defects, and 
it was his duty under the Contract and 
under principles of equity to notify 
the plaintiffs of any defects found 
and to give the plaintiffs opportunity 
to rectify them. 
Failure to give the plaintiffs 
this opportunity is 
the decision of the 
inequitable, and 
trial court is 
clearly against all rules of equity. 
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POINT 3. 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
ERROR IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Plaintiffs assert that for all 
the reasons set forth above 3 the lower 
Court committed error in denying their 
Motion for a New Trial, and submit 
that said Court, pursuant to Rule 59 
(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, should have rrsde New Findings. 
Conclusions and Judgment ln Plaintiffs' 
favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants contend that the evi-
dence and testimony presented to the 
lower Court clearly entitled them to a 
decree of specific performance of the 
Contract they entered into with the 
defendant. The result of the defen-
dant's position in this action is 
grossly inequitable to the plaintiffs 
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and against all rules of equity) and 
that for the reasons submitted herein 
the decision of the trial court should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. Vernon Erickson and Tex R. Olsen, 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
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